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CASE COMMENTS
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF REGULATIONS
PROMULGATED UNDER THE SURFACE
MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION ACT
OF 1977In Re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation

Congress enacted the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977' on August 3, 1977, which mandates that the

environment be protected from the damaging effects of surface3
coal mining2 and provides for a two-stage regulatory scheme

Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, §§ 101-908, 30
U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-1328 (West Supp. 1978) [hereinafter referred to as the Act or the
SMCRA].
2 30 U.S.C.A. § 1202 (West Supp. 1978) provides:
It is the purpose of this chapter to (a) establish a nationwide program to protect society and the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations;
(b) assure that the rights of surface landowners and other persons
with a legal-interest in the land or appurtenances thereto are fully protected from such operations;
(c) assure that surface mining operations are not conducted where
reclamation as required by this chapter is not feasible;
(d) assure that surface coal mining operations are so conducted as
to protect the environment;
(e) assure that adequate procedures are undertaken to reclaim surface areas as contemporaneously as possible with the surface coal mining
operations;
(f) assure that the coal supply essential to the Nation's energy requirements, and to its economic and social well-being is provided and
strike a balance between protection of the environment and agricultural
productivity and the Nation's need for coal as an essential source of
energy;
(g) assist the States in developing and implementing a program to
achieve the purposes of this chapter;
(h) promote the reclamation of mined areas left without adequate
reclamation prior to August 3, 1977, and which continue, in their unreclaimed condition, to substantially degrade the quality of the environment, prevent or damage the beneficial use of land or water resources, or
endanger the health or safety of the public;
(i) assure that appropriate procedures are provided for the public
participation in the development, revision, and enforcement of regulations, standards, reclamation plans, or programs established by the Secretary or any State under this chapter;

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1979

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 4 [1979], Art. 12

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

aimed at effectuating such environmental protection. Under the
Act, surface mining operations are regulated initially by interim
regulations which were issued by the Secretary of the Interior on
December 13, 1977.1 These regulations control the industry while
permanent regulatory programs are being developed and effectuated by the states, or by the Department of the Interior in the
absence of state action.1-5
The interim regulations promulgated by the Department of
the Interior have been the subject of numerous and diverse legal
challenges by a variety of plaintiffs including coal operators, the
National Coal Association, the National Wildlife Association, and
the states of Virginia and West Virginia, among others. In accord-

ance with the Act, these challenges have been heard by the District
Court for the District of Columbia.(j) provide a means for development of the data and analyses necessary to establish effective and reasonable regulation of surface mining
operations for other minerals;
(k) encourage the full utilization of coal resources through the development and application of underground extraction technologies;
(1) stimulate, sponsor, provide for and/or supplement present programs for the conduct of research investigations, experiments, and demonstrations, in the exploration, extraction, processing, development, and
production of minerals and the training of mineral engineers and scientists in the field of mining, minerals resources, and technology, and the
establishment of an appropriate research and training center in various
States; and
(in) wherever necessary, exercise the full reach of Federal constitutional powers to insure the protection of the public interest through effective control of surface coal mining operations.
30 U.S.C.A. § 1251 (West Supp. 1978) requires the two-stage regulatory
scheme. Section 1251(a) provides that the Secretary is to promulgate interim regulations within ninety days of enactment and also provides the rulemaking process
to be used in their promulgation. Id. Section 1251(b) provides that within one year
the Secretary is to promulgate a permanent regulatory scheme and establish procedures and requirements for the preparation, submission, and approval of state
programs. Id.
The interim regulations are found in 42 Fed. Reg. 62,639-716 (Dec. 13, 1977)
(to be codified in 30 C.F.R. §§ 700, 710, 715-718, 720-723, 740, 795, and 830 (1978)),
[all Federal Register citations hereinafter cited directly to the page upon which the
material appears].
The jurisdiction of the District Court of the District of Columbia to hear these
challenges is established in 30 U.S.C.A. § 1276(a) (West Supp. 1978). The court has
issued two memorandum opinions and orders in regard to these challenges. The first
opinion, In re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 452 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C.
1978), decided May 3, 1978, consolidated twenty-two cases and ruled on motions
for summary judgments and preliminary injunctions. The following determinations
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In the August 24, 1978, opinion of In Re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation,6 the district court consolidated the twenty-four
actions before it and ruled on the plaintiffs' motions for summary
judgment. The court granted the motions made in regard to the
were made by the court in that opinion:
a) that the regulations' basis and purpose statement was adequate, Id. at 333;
b) that the Secretary gave due consideration to the economic impact of the
regulations and that an economic impact statement was not required, Id. at 334;
c) that the provisions regulating surface effects of underground mining, prime
farmlands, spoil and waste disposal, and alluvial valley floors were properly included in the interim program, Id. at 336-38;
d) that the Secretary was not required to include exemption and variance
procedures in the regulatory scheme, Id. at 338-39;
e) that the statute does not explicitly require that preexisting structures
which meet the performance standards of the statute be reconstructed to meet the
design criteria of the regulations and that such regulations requiring such reconstruction are enjoined, Id. at 339-40;
f) that the regulation which specifies that permit revisions and renewals covered by the grandfather provision of the prime farmlands section of the statute was
reasonable but that related provisions which impose performance standards on
operations that are exempt from such standards under the grandfather provision
are enjoined, Id. at 340;
g) that the regulations concerning subsoil and topsoil handling are reasona-*
ble, Id. at 341;
h) that the regulations imposing standards on dams merely impounding
wastes are enjoined, Id. at 341;
i) that the regulation concerning blasting was upheld, Id. at 342;
j) that the regulation implementing the small operators exemption was reasonable, Id. at 342-43;
k) that the regulations governing the performance standards of sedimentation
ponds are enjoined until the Secretary publishes "final interim regulations," Id. at
343;
1) that the regulations setting forth numerical effluent limitations on discharges from areas disturbed by surface mining operations are enjoined to the
extent that the standards supersede, amend or modify the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1175 (1970), Id. at 343-44;
m) that the Secretary's refusal to allow the use of the rock core drainage
methods in head-of-hollow or valley fills was reasonable, Id. at 344-45;
n) that the regulations which in certain situations require letters of financial
commitment from third parties are reasonable, Id. at 345; and
o) that the limited variances allowed by the regulations are not contrary to
the mandates of the statute and that the Secretary's action in this regard was
reasonable, Id. at 346.
The second opinion, also entitled In re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation,
456 F. Supp. 1301 (D.D.C. 1978), decided August 24, 1978, is the subject of this
commentary.
' 456 F. Supp. 1301 (D.D.C. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Regulation
Litigation].
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regulations concerning prime farmlands7 and drawdown and freeboard requirements for waste dams. 8 The court upheld all of the
other regulations challenged.' However, certain regulations con' Section 716.7(a)(1) defines prime farmlands, in part, as lands which have
been used for the production of cultivated crops for at least five years out of twenty
years preceding the date of the permit application. 42 Fed. Reg. 62,693 (1977) (to
be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 716.7(a)(1)). The Secretary explained that the five out
of twenty requirement was necessary to include lands used for cultivation in a long.
term rotation. The court, however, enjoined the regulation remanding it to the
Secretary because it was not adequately explained in the basis and purpose statement nor was it adequately supported in the administrative record. 456 F. Supp.
at 1312.
The plaintiffs challenged two sections of the regulations which set standards
for the construction of waste dams. These sections required that the waste dam be
capable of evacuating 90% of the volume of water stored during the design precipitation event within ten days, and that there be three feet between the top of the
dam and the surface of the water impounded. 42 Fed. Reg. 67,688-89 (1977) (to be
codified in 30 C.F.R. §§ 715.18(b)(3)(ii), (vii)). While the defendants were able to
show ample support for these requirements in their brief, it appears that the Secretary resolved some differences of opinion and made several policy judgments that
were not disclosed in the basis and purpose statement. The Secretary, therefore,
was required to reconsider the regulations after accepting additional comments. 456
F. Supp. at 1316-17.
1 The court made the following determinations in favor of the Secretary:
a) the use of terracing is to be limited and must be approved by the regulatory
authority, 456 F. Supp. at 1309;
b) toxic, acid forming and combustible materials must be treated to neutralize toxicity or covered with a minimum of four feet of nontoxic and noncombustible
material, Id. at 1309-10;
c) the Secretary's provisions regulating underground mines in the areas of
valley fill underdrains, soil compaction and cover of toxic materials are proper and
reasonable, Id. at 1312-13;
d) surface mined lands must be restored to a condition approximating that
which would have existed prior to mining had the lands been properly managed
(without regard to the actual condition prior to mining operations), Id. at 1313;
e) the definition of an aquifer was upheld, Id. at 1313;
f) none of the interim regulations concerning water pollution amend, supercede or repeal any of the provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
Id. at 1313-15;
g) road gradient requirements were upheld, Id. at 1315-16;
h) the decible limit for air blasts caused by the use of explosives was upheld
as established by the regulations at a 128 decible linear peak, Id. at 1317;
i) maximum peak particle velocity limitations of one inch per second at the
immediate location of dwellings and certain types of buildings were upheld for
explosive blasts, Id. at 1317;
j) warrantless search provisions of the regulations as qualified by the Secretary were upheld, based primarily on the coal industry's status as a "pervasively
regulated industry," Id. at 1317-19;
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cerning buffer zones 0 and head-of-hollow fills," while being upheld
and allowed to remain in force, were remanded to the Secretary for
reconsideration in light of additional data and comments.
In promulgating the interim regulations, the Office of Surface
Mining utilized the informal rulemaking process provided by the
k) the Secretary will be able to order the cessation of coal operations without
prior notice and a hearing, Id. at 1319-21;
1) hearing procedures after a cessation order is issued are adequate, Id. at
1321-23;
m) an operator will not be allowed an extension past the ninety day period
for abatement even if good cause is shown, Id. at 1323;
n) past corrected violations can be considered in a finding of a pattern of
violations sufficient to revoke a permit, Id. at 1323-24;
o) regulations concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the interim
regulatory program as to Indian lands were upheld, Id. at 1324-26;
p) a permit to mine on Indian lands means essentially "approval" by the
Secretary, Id. at 1326; and
q) decisions of the court as to the interim regulations will apply to
"overlapping" sections that are in the provisions of the Indian lands regulation, Id.
at 1326.
11The. plaintiffs challenged the regulation which prohibits operators from disturbing land within 100 feet of an intermittent or perennial stream unless authorized by the regulatory authority to do so. 42 Fed. Reg. 62,686 (1977) (to be codified
in 30 C.F.R. § 715.17(d)(3)). The court found that the Government's brief pointed
to ample support in the administrative record but that the certified index in the
record was deficient in that it had not listed some of the sources relied upon by the
Government. The court refused to enjoin the regulation but instructed the Secretary to accept additional comments from the public concerning these sources omitted from the index and to reconsider the regulation in light of the additional comments. 456 F. Supp. at 1315.
11The plaintiffs attacked several provisions which regulate the use of valley
and head-of-hollow fills for spoil disposal. 456 F. Supp. at 1310. The regulations
were supported by an "ongoing study," 42 Fed. Reg. 62,647 (1977), A 1977 interim
report concerning valley and head-of-hollow fills prepared by the consulting firm
of Skelly and Loy. SKELLY & Loy, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF SURFACE MINING
METHODs, HEAr-oF-HOLLow FILL AND MOUNTAIN REMOVAL (Interim Report 1977).

The court, limited to reviewing the record before the Secretary, upheld the regulation but required the Secretary to reconsider the regulation in light of a 1978 report
by Skelly and Loy which supplemented and updated the 1977 report. SKELLY &
Loy, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF SURFACE MINING METHODs, HEAD-oF-HoLLOW
FILL AND MOUNTAIN REMOVAL (Interim Report 1978). The plaintiffs also challenged
provisions concerning the construction of underdrains and the compaction of soil
in valley fills. 42 Fed. Reg. 62,684 (1977) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. §§ 715.
15(b)(6), (7)). The court found these regulations to be reasonable and to be adequately supported by the record and therefore upheld them. 456 F. Supp. at 1312.
The court, however, required that these regulations also be reconsidered in light of
the 1978 Skelly and Loy report.
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Act. 2 Under the Act, the District Court for the District of Columbia has sole jurisdiction to review this rulemaking process." The
district court, pursuant to section 526(a)(1) of the Act, used the
"arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise inconsistent with law" standard of review." This standard is a highly deferential one which
presumes the agency's action to be valid and forbids the court from
substituting its judgment for that of the agency. 5 The standard
requires that the agency's action be rationally "based upon a consideration of the relevant factors"'" and, therefore, the court must
make a "searching and careful" review of the facts. 7
Generally, the appropriate degree of judicial scrutiny a court
should employ when reviewing administrative regulations has been
described by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia as requiring the reviewing court to
12 30 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (West Supp. 1978) provides:

[Tihe Secretary shall promulgate and publish in the Federal Register
regulations covering an interim regulatory procedure for surface coal mining and reclamation operations. .

.

. which shall be concise and written

in plain, understandable language shall not be promulgated and published by the Secretary until he has (A) published proposed regulations in the Federal Register and afforded interested persons and State and local governments a period of not
less than thirty days after such publication to submit written comments
thereon;
(B) obtained the written concurrence of the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency with respect to those regulations promulgated under this section which relate to air and water quality standards promulgated under the authority of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, as amended, and the Clean Air Act, as amended; and
(C) held at least one public hearing on the proposed regulations.
The date, time, and place of any hearing held on the proposed regulations
shall be set out in the publication of the proposed regulations. The Secretary shall consider all comments and relevant data presented at such
hearing before final promulgation and publication of the regulations.
13 30 U.S.C.A. § 1276(a)(1) (West Supp. 1978).
" Id. This section states in part that "[amny action subject to judicial review
under this subsection shall be affirmed unless the court concludes that such action
is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise inconsistent with law." This is in accord with
the standard set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)
(1976).
12See American Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees Local 100 v.
Cleveland, 484 F.2d 339, 346 (6th Cir. 1973). See also Wright, The Courts and the
Rulemaking Process:The Limits of JudicialReview, 59 CoRN. L. Rav. 375 (1974).
"1 Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285
(1974); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
17Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
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understand enough about the problem confronting the agency
to comprehend the meaning of the evidence relied upon and the
evidence discarded; the questions addressed by the agency and
those bypassed; the choices open to the agency and those made.
The more technical the case, the more intensive must be the
court's effort to understand the evidence, for without an appropriate understanding of the case before it the court cannot properly perform its appellate function.' s
This is accomplished by reviewing the informal record which consists of all of the data before the agency at the time the agency
action was taken. 9
Ordinarily, upon reviewing an agency's regulations, a court
will either: 1) find that the agency's regulation is reasonable and
enforce it; or 2) find that the regulation is "arbitrary, capricious,
or inconsistent with law" and enjoin it. 2" In RegulationLitigation,
however, the district court employed an innovative procedure. As
an alternative to either upholding or enjoining the regulations, the
court remanded regulations for reconsideration while leaving them
in force.
The court found authority for such a procedure in
EnvironmentalDefense Fund, Inc. v. Costle,2' wherein the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld regulations
which were promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency
under the Safe Drinking Water Act." The regulations had been
challenged as being too lenient in light of scientific data which had
been developed and published subsequent to the regulations' promulgation. Although the Costle court did not utilize the new data
in its review of the regulations, it remanded the administrative
record to the agency to assess the new findings and to consider
possible amendments to the regulations." In enforcing the regulations while remanding the administrative record for reconsideration, the court relied upon the broad statutory authority of Chapter 28, section 2106 of the United States Code. 4
1BEthyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976).
11Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). See also
Wright, supra note 15, at 390.
21 Administrative Procedure Act, § 2, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
21578 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1175 (1970).
21

578 F.2d 337, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
The statute provides:
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Costle is a logical extension of cases which have dealt with
rulemaking that concerns scientific factual questions which the
scientific community has not yet answered definitively.n In Ethyl
Corp. v. Environmental ProtectionAgency 6 the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that
[tihe Administrator may apply his expertise to draw conclusions from suspected, but not completely substantiated, relationships between facts, from trends among facts, from theoretical projections from imperfect data, from probative preliminary data not yet certifiable as 'fact,' and the like .

. .

. [A]

conclusion so drawn-a risk assessment-may, if rational, form
the basis for health-related regulations .

. .

.

In Ethyl and other cases, the courts have upheld agency regulations as reasonable and not "arbitrary, capricious, or inconsistent
2
with law" when based upon assessments and policy judgments. 1
But the court in Costle went a step further and not only upheld
the regulations but also remanded the administrative record for
further consideration by the agency in light of new data. Confined
to considering only the administrative record as it appeared at the
time the regulation was promulgated, the court found the regulation to be reasonable. Yet, the court also recognized that the new
data was significant and that the area of law was one in which
knowledge and technology are rapidly expanding. The court concluded that a remand of the regulation was necessitated by the
aforementioned factors to force the agency to reconsider it in light
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may

affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order
of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the cause
and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or
require such further proceeding to be had as may be just under the circumstances.
28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1976). This procedure has been held applicable to judicial review
of administrative agency orders. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. F.C.C., 463
F.2d 268, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
2 Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 20-24 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976); Industrial Union Dept. v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
Int'l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also
Bazelon, Copingwith Technology Through the Legal Process,62 CORN. L. REV. 817
(1977).
(' 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 941 (1978).

1 Id. at 28.
21 See note 24 supra.
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of the subsequent data. The court therefore ordered the agency to
report to the court within sixty days regarding significant changes
and to advise the court of its determinations as to whether it
planned to propose amendments to the interim regulation in view
of the newly acquired data."
The facts of RegulationLitigationand Costle are distinguishable. In Costle, the court of appeals was presented with new data
not in existence at the time the challenged regulation was promulgated. In Regulation Litigation, however, the district court was
presented with a 1978 update 0 of an ongoing study, 3' which had
been cited as supporting evidence for several provisions which regulate the use of valley and head-of-hollow fills for spoil disposal.2
The plaintiffs asserted that the additional facts in the 1978 update
undermined the agency's basis for the regulations.3 The district
court evidently considered that any distinction between this update and the new scientific data of Costle was insignificant. The
court found that the regulations concerning valley and head-ofhollow fills were lawful and enforceable but, as in Costle, determined that the revelations of the update report lent credibility to
the plaintiffs' assertions and warranted a reconsideration by the
agency.
In RegulationLitigation,the "new data" idea was not the only
basis for the district court's decision to uphold the regulations
while remanding them for reconsideration. In reviewing the buffer
zone requirement of subsection 715.17(d)(3) of the regulations,"
the district court enlarged the application of the procedure of enforcing a regulation pending reconsideration. The district court
found ample support for the regulation in the administrative record, but the sources relied upon in the government's brief were not
listed in the certified index.? Instead of enjoining the regulation
- 578 F.2d 337, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
See SKELLY & Loy, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT

OF SURFACE MINo METHHEAD-oF-HoLLow FLL AND MouNTAn REMOVAL (Interim Report 1978).
11See SKELLY & Loy, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF SURFACE MINING METHoDs, HEAr-OF-HoLLOw FILL AND MOUNTAIN REMOVAL (Interim Report 1977).

ODs,

456 F. Supp. at 1310-11.
3 Id. at 1310-12; see State of West Virginia Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement the Record or in the Alternative, to Lodge Relevant
Document, July 18, 1978 at 2. In Re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 456 F.
Supp. 1301 (D.D.C. 1978).
3142 Fed. Reg. 62,686 (1977).
3 456 F. Supp. at 1315.
32
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because of this procedural defect, the court deemed it appropriate
to enforce the regulation with the requirement that the agency
receive additional comments and reconsider the regulation." The
district court found the regulation to be reasonable and not
"arbitrary, capricious, or inconsistent with law." 3 It is also apparent that the court considered the presence of a variance procedure
as a factor in the balancing of potential harms. With the presence
of a variance procedure, the likelihood of harm resulting to the
plaintiffs pending reconsideration of the regulation was minimal
even if the regulation was left in force.
The court's decision with respect to the buffer zone requirement evinces a determination that the procedure of upholding regulations, while simultaneously remanding them for reconsideration, is appropriate not only in the face of new scientific data, but
also when an agency has failed to comply with a required procedure in promulgating the regulation. In Regulation Litigationthe
procedural failure was the denial of the public's opportunity to
comment fully on some source or data relied upon by the agency.
Since the agency failed to abide by required procedure, the public
was deprived of the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the
rulemaking process by submitting comments to the agency. Ordinarily, such a procedural failure by the agency is fatal, and the
regulation is regarded as null and void.3 The district court, however, viewed the procedural failure of the agency to be merely a
technicality. Considering the otherwise ample support for the regulation in the administrative record and the availability of the variance procedure to avoid potential harm to the plaintiffs, the court
concluded that the procedural defect could be cured by remanding
the regulation for reconsideration while allowing it to remain in
force.
The court, however, did not extend the procedure of upholding
the regulation while also remanding it for reconsideration when it
found more than technical failures in the promulgation of a regulation. Such was the situation in the review of subsections
715.18(b)(3)(ii) and (vii) which involve drawdown and freeboard
requirements for waste dams. 9 The court found that although the
-mId.
27

Id.

See Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight, Inc., 419 U.S. 281
(1974); Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Associated Indus. v.
United States, 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1973).
1,42 Fed. Reg. 62,688-89 (1977).
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Government's brief indicated that the regulations were reasonable
and adequately supported by the administrative record, the Secretary had resolved some differences of opinion and made several
policy judgments that were not disclosed in the basis and purpose
statement.4" The court determined that the agency had given only
cursory discussion in the basis and purpose statement as to the
drawdown and freeboard requirements and that the authorities
cited by the Secretary were not as supportive as indicated.4' Because of this procedural defect and because a balancing of harms
to the plaintiffs and to the environment was favorable to the plaintiffs' position, the district court enjoined enforcement of these requirements and remanded them for additional comments in light
of the disclosure of the decisions and policy judgments made by the
agency." Although the court considered this matter to be similar
to that which it faced in reviewing the buffer zone requirement, it
considered the determinative factor in the differing results to be
the balancing of harm.43 In these two instances, the presence or
absence of a variance provision was the most significant consideration in the balancing of harm. The presence of a variance provision
in the buffer zone requirements was decisive in the court's determination that there was little likelihood of harm to the industry
plaintiffs if the requirements were left in force pending reconsideration. The lack of a variance provision in the drawdown and freeboard requirements meant that absolute compliance would be necessary if they were left in force. The costs that the industry plaintiffs would have incurred if the requirements were later amended
were substantial when compared to the possible harm that might
result to the environment and to the public if the requirements
were enjoined pending reconsideration.44
The district court has applied an innovative approach in its
review of the agency's informal rulemaking. The practice of remanding a regulation for reconsideration in light of new or additional data while allowing the regulation to remain in force appears
especially appropriate in surface mining, an area involving both
significant environmental and economic implications and rapid
40 456 F. Supp. at 1316.
Id.
I'

4 Id. at 1316-17.
Id. at 1316.
" Id. at 1316 n.16. The court placed,much reliance upon the fact that the Mine
Enforcement and Safety Administration regulations would adequately protect the
public safety and environment.
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legal and technological advancements. The district court has also
demonstrated its willingness to uphold regulations even when the
agency has failed to follow the procedural dictates of the Act. The
court employed a balancing of harms, and the result of this balancing process was given great weight by the court in its consideration
of procedurally defective regulations. The buffer zone regulations
were enforced, despite a technical procedural defect, in light of the
presence of a variance procedure which could operate to protect the
plaintiffs from harm while the regulations were being reconsidered.
The drawdown and freeboard regulations, however, were enjoined
because it was found that the public would not suffer significantly
if the regulations were enjoined and that the plaintiffs would be
put to considerable expense if the regulations were upheld but later
amended.
While the court's actions are not in strict accord with the
traditional rules and procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act,45 they are authorized under the broad provision of Chapter 28, section 2106 of the United States Code." The procedure of
remanding a regulation for reconsideration while enforcing it is a
half-measure, compromising between unqualified enforcement
and injunction. The district court's use of this compromise in
Regulation Litigationappears to be appropriate and justifiable. In
the area of "new data," a court cannot properly enjoin the regulation if it is reasonably based on the "old data," so the remand for
reconsideration seems to be the only appropriate alternative for a
court that believes the regulations concerned may not be adequately fulfilling their purpose in light of the new information. In
the area of procedurally defective regulations where the defect is
relatively insignificant, it seems appropriate to allow the procedural defect to be cured by reconsideration while enforcing the
regulation if the public interest is best served by such curative
measure. The balancing of harms is an appropriate test to make
this determination of the public interest.
The innovative procedure adopted in Regulation Litigation
interjects the court's equitable discretion into the conventional
judicial review of administrative rulemaking. This equitable discretion can be used to provide a more just resolution of disputes
between conflicting interests. In order for this procedure to serve
4 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976).
Is 28 U.S.C.A. § 2106 (West Supp. 1978).
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its intended purpose, however, it is incumbent upon the agency to
which a regulation is remanded for reconsideration to follow
through with a sincere and diligent reexamination of the regulation. This good faith reexamination is necessary because the procedure has no inherent coercive or binding effect.
Joyce Fleming Ofsa
David E. Godwin
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